We introduce knowledge flow analysis, a simple and flexible formalism for checking cryptographic protocols. Knowledge flows provide a uniform language for expressing the actions of principals, assumptions about intruders, and the properties of cryptographic primitives. Our approach enables a generalized two-phase analysis: we extend the two-phase theory by identifying the necessary and sufficient properties of a broad class of cryptographic primitives for which the theory holds. We also contribute a library of standard primitives and show that they satisfy our criteria.
Introduction
One area of major successes for formal methods has been the verification of security protocols. A number of specialized tools have been developed in the last decade that have exposed subtle flaws in existing protocols (see, e.g. [27, 11] ). Many of these tools [10, 11, 15 ] use a two-phase approach to efficiently identify intrusion scenarios.
This paper presents knowledge flow analysis, a lightweight and flexible formalism for checking cryptographic protocols. Our approach is based on a simple mathematical foundation that provides an extensible framework for two-phase analysis. In particular, we generalize the two-phase theory of Clarke et al [10] by identifying the properties of cryptographic primitives for which the theory holds. We demonstrate the generality of our criteria by using them to build a library of standard cryptographic primitives: public and symmetric encryption/decryption, signing, pair/set construction, nonce generation, and hashing. The sample library can be extended to include blind signing, certification, and many other functions from the rich class of primitives that satisfy our criteria.
Our approach gives a uniform formalism for expressing the actions of principals, assumptions on intruders, and properties of cryptographic primitives. The dynamic behavior of the protocol is described by an initial state of knowledge, and a collection of rules that dictate how knowledge may flow amongst principals. Protocol rules are embedded into the initial state of knowledge as values that can be composed and decomposed by a special rule primitive, which satisfies the two-phase criteria.
The knowledge flow approach grew out of an effort to check a new cryptographic scheme [19, 18] . Knowledge flow analysis described here was the final result of a series of incremental attempts at formalizing and checking their assumptions using the Alloy language and tool [24, 23] . This process drew out the single source axiom which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been described before: the security of cryptographic functions depends on the assumption that their fixed points are hard to compute.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the key intuitions underlying the approach, using the Needham-Schroeder protocol [34] as an example. Section 3 gives the mathematical foundations of the approach. Section 4 formulates and proves the two-phase theory in the knowledge flow context. Section 5 provides a mathematical characterization of the primitives to which the two-phase theory applies. Section 6 presents a sample subset of these primitives. The paper closes with a discussion of related work and concluding remarks.
Knowledge Flow Basics
The key idea behind knowledge flow analysis is the observation that, at the most basic level, the purpose of a security protocol is to distribute knowledge among its legitimate participants. A protocol is flawed if it allows an intruder to learn a value that is intended to remain strictly within the legitimate principals' pool of knowledge. To gain more intuition about knowledge flows in security applications, consider the original Needham-Schroeder protocol [34] :
1.
Alice transmits E PK(B) (I A , N A ) to Bob 2.
Bob transmits E PK(A) (N A , N B ) to Alice 3.
Alice transmits E PK(B) (N B ) to Bob.
We have two principals, Alice and Bob, each of whom has an initial supply of knowledge. Alice's initial knowledge, for example, consists of her own public/private key pair PK(A)/SK(A), identity I A , nonce N A , and Bob's public key PK(B) and identity I B . The purpose of the protocol is to distribute the nonces between Alice and Bob in such a way that the following conditions hold at the end: (i) Alice and Bob both know N A and N B , and (ii) no other principal knows both nonces.
To initiate the protocol, Alice first expands her pool of knowledge to include E PK(B) (I A , N A ), an encryption of her identity and nonce with Bob's public key. She then sends the cipher to Bob who decrypts it using his private key, SK(B). At the end of the first step of the protocol, Bob's knowledge has increased to include the values E PK(B) (I A , N A ) and N A . Bob performs the second step of the protocol by adding E PK(A) (N A , N B ) to his current knowledge and sending the cipher to Alice. She uses her private key to decrypt Bob's message and extract N B . By using N B and P K(B), Alice can set up an authenticated and private channel with Bob as is done during the final step of the protocol in which Alice creates E PK(B) (N B ) and forwards it to Bob. Both Alice and Bob now know the two nonces and share all the knowledge except their secret keys.
Following the flow of knowledge in the Needham-Schroeder protocol provides a crucial insight underlying our analysis method. Namely, a principal can learn a value in one of three ways; he can · draw the value at the start, · compute it using his current knowledge, or · learn it by communication.
Our analysis treats the latter two ways of obtaining knowledge as equivalent. Specifically, we can think of Alice's computing E PK(B) (I A , N A ) as her learning it from a principal called Encryptor whose initial pool of values includes all possible ciphers: Alice sends the tuple (PK(B), (I A , N A )) to Encryptor who responds by sending back the encryption of (I A , N A ) with PK(B).
Treating cryptographic primitives as principals allows us to consider the total pool of knowledge to be fixed. That is, the set of all values before and after the execution of a security protocol is the same; the only difference is the distribution of those values among the principals. Since we assume that principals never forget values, the set of principals who know a value at the end of a protocol session subsumes the set of principals who drew the value at the beginning.
The goal of analyzing knowledge flows in a protocol is to verify that particular values never leak out of the honest participants' pool of knowledge. In other words, we are interested in analyzing the flow of knowledge from an intruder's perspective. This observation allows us to make sound simplifying assumptions that drastically reduce the effort needed to formalize a protocol in terms of knowledge flows:
· We need not encode the flows of knowledge among the honest principals, such as the flow which allows Alice to learn E PK(A) (N A , N B ) from Encryptor. Rather, we may assume that each honest principal draws all values in the total knowledge pool and specify protocols solely in terms of the intruders' knowledge flows (sections 3.1 and 3.2).
· We may model all adversaries, including the untrusted public network, with a single opponent whom we call Oscar. The soundness of this approach is formally proved in section 3.3. Intuitively, the approach makes sense if we note that the potential adversaries will be most effective when they collaborate and share knowledge among themselves. Hence, we can replace the (collaboration of) adversaries with a single principal who possesses all their knowledge, without excluding any intrusion scenarios.
In our example, the flow of knowledge from the intruder's perspective starts with the protocol initialization message E PK(B) (I A , N A ), since Oscar needs no prior knowledge to learn the first cipher that Alice sends to Bob. In general, because Oscar includes the untrusted public network, he learns the first message of the protocol for free, regardless of who its intended recipient and sender are:
The variables a and b denote the honest principals (Alice and Bob), and the set O stands for Oscar. The notation N (ǫ, I(p)) represents the nonce that the nonce primitive generated for the principal identified by I(p) using the random value ǫ as the seed. For example, Alice's identity is I(a) = I A and Alice's nonce is N (ǫ, I(a)) = N A . The empty set means that Oscar needs no prior knowledge to learn
Once his pool of knowledge includes E PK(B) (I A , N A ), Oscar learns the corresponding response, E PK(A) (N A , N B ). More generally 1 ,
The variable V denotes the set of all values, or the fixed pool of knowledge. Note that our formalization constrains the seed of Bob's nonce to be Alice's initialization message. This is needed to establish that Bob's nonce was generated in the context of the protocol session started by Alice with E PK(B) (I A , N A ).
The resulting correspondence between the nonces prevents our analysis from sounding false alarms when Oscar legitimately obtains two nonces from Alice and Bob by running a valid protocol session with each. Oscar learns the final message, E PK(B) (N B ), as a consequence of knowing E PK(A) (N A , N B ). Formally,
Knowledge Flow Analysis
Knowledge flow analysis is based on a simple mathematical foundation. This section formalizes the ideas outlined in the discussion of knowledge flow basics. We describe how communication rules direct knowledge flows (3.1), show that our treatment of primitives ensures a fixed pool of values (3.2) , and formulate the analysis problem in terms of Oscar's knowledge flows (3.3).
Communicating Knowledge
We denote the sets of all principals and values by P and V . A subset of P × V is a state of knowledge drawn from K = 2 P ×V , the set of all possible states of knowledge. For a given state of knowledge k ∈ K, we say that "p knows v" if (p, v) ∈ k.
Definition 1 A tuple (R, k 0 ) is a knowledge flow for (P, V ) directed by the communication rules R ⊆ P × V × P × K and originating from the state k 0 ∈ K.
A communication rule describes the conditions under which one principal may gain knowledge from another. For example, the rule (e, E PK(
states that the encryptor e will tell the cipher E PK(b) (v) to the principal p a if p a knows p b 's public key and the plaintext v. Note that our definition of a communication rule limits the class of protocols expressible in the knowledge flow framework. In particular, our rules cannot be used to specify conditions under which information is withheld from a principal, such as "a will not tell v to b if b knows x". To the best of our knowledge, no protocol proposed for practical use requires this form of expressiveness.
Given a set of communication rules R, we say that k ′ ∈ K is reachable from k ∈ K via R if k ′ is the result of applying all rules in R to k at most once; i.e.
A state of knowledge k n is reachable in the context of a knowledge flow
is monotonically increasing in R and k 0 , any valid state of knowledge is a subset of the maximal state of knowledge. Hence, the maximal state of knowledge is also the smallest fixed point of f R which subsumes k 0 . It is evident from Definition 2 that self-rules such as r = (p, v, p, k p ) ∈ R do not affect the flow of knowledge: f R (k) = f R−{r} (k). We therefore assume that R does not contain any self-rules.
Initial Knowledge
For each value v, Source(v) = {p : (p, v) ∈ k 0 } defines the set of principals who draw v. In the knowledge flow framework, a principal p outside of Source(v) can learn v only by communicating with principals who know v. We therefore treat cryptographic primitives, and other computationally feasible algorithms, as principals. For example, suppose that, in practice, p can compute v by applying the algorithm A to inputs i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n . We model A by adding the principal A to P , the tuple (A, v) to k 0 , and the rule
Our treatment of primitives ensures that Knowledge(k 0 ) = {v : (p, v) ∈ k 0 for some p ∈ P } consists of all learnable values. Hence, V is the same in the initial and the maximal state of knowledge,
which implies that we can safely restrict our analysis to the subset of R which only involves values in Knowledge(k 0 ). We further simplify our approach by constraining k 0 , and therefore R, according to standard security assumptions. Specifically, we assume the single source axiom for values that are fixed points of cryptographic functions. For example, if the primitive h models a hashing function H, then we assume that {h} = Source(x) for all x such that x = H(x). We thus model the assumption that solving the equation x = H(x) is computationally hard by stating that no principal other than h can draw x:
The consequence of the single-source axiom is that no principal outside of {p} = Source(v) can ever learn v ∈ F p :
Lemma 4
If the fixed sets F p for p ∈ P satisfy the single-source axiom, then, for all p ∈ P , p a ∈ P , and
Proof. We use induction on n. The case n = 0 is equivalent to the single-source axiom. Suppose that the lemma holds for n, our induction hypothesis.
and the lemma follows from the induction hypothesis, or (ii) there exists a p b ∈ P and
The lemma follows by induction on n.
Together with Equation (4), Lemma 4 
where F is the union of all F p and
Hence, we need to analyze only the knowledge flows characterized by R F .
Adversaries' Knowledge
Let O ⊆ P be a group of collaborating adversaries. We collapse O into a single principal o using the following merging function:
The merging of adversaries does not rule out any attacks because
We subsequently assume that M erge is implied and use P , R, and k 0 to refer to M erge(P ), M erge(R), and M erge(k 0 ).
Security properties of protocols are expressed as predicates on the values known to Oscar in the maximal state of knowledge. We therefore focus our analysis of knowledge flows to finding all the values in the projection of f * R F (k 0 ) on Oscar. Specifically, we introduce the projection function g and show that its smallest fixed point is the image of Oscar under f * R F (k 0 ).
The set of values reachable from X is given by g * (X), which is the limit of g n (X) as n → ∞.
is maximized if (a) Oscar tells everything he knows to the honest principals and (b) the honest principals tell each other all values learnable in polynomial time-which, in our framework, are the values in Knowledge(k 0 ) − F . Formally, Oscar's final knowledge is maximized when
Proof. We use induction on n. For n = 0, X n = X 0 = g n (X 0 ). Let X n = g n (X 0 ), our induction hypothesis. We now need to prove that
which is equivalent to x ∈ X n , or (ii) there exists a p ∈ P and
by Lemma 4. This argument also proves that the condition k σ ⊆ k n is equivalent to
ii) holds if and only if there exists a set X σ ⊆ X n such that X σ → x. By Definition 5, case (i) or case (ii) holds if and only if x ∈ g(X n ). Hence, X n+1 = g(X n ) and the theorem follows by induction on n.
Two-Phase Theory
The formalism developed in the previous sections enables a systematic and efficient analysis of Oscar's knowledge flows. Specifically, Oscar's final pool of values can be computed in two phases by first applying all the decomposing rules in R and then all the composing ones. This is a consequence of the 'two-phase theory' [15, 10] , which we now formulate and prove in the knowledge flow framework. Intuitively, a composing rule combines its inputs into an output value from which some or all of the inputs can be extracted using a corresponding decomposing rule, if one exists. For example, the composing rule r z = {x, y} → p x + iy, where x = 0 and y = 0, combines the non-zero real numbers x and y into the complex number x + iy. The corresponding decomposing rules, r x = {x + iy} → p x and r y = {x + iy} → p y, reconstruct the inputs to r z from its output. Formally, we define composing and decomposing rules as follows: Definition 7 Let p be a principal with a partial ordering ≺ p on the set of values V . We call X → p x
• composing, if X ≺ p x, that is, v ≺ p x for all v ∈ X, and • decomposing, if there exists a value v ∈ X with x ≺ p v such that x ∈ X ′ for all composing X ′ → p v.
We say that v controls p x.
Principal p is composing/decomposing if there exists a partial ordering ≺ p such that for all X ⊆ V and x ∈ V , X → p x is composing or decomposing.
Our definition permits the images of composing rules of different principals to intersect. In practice, however, such intersections are hard to compute; that is, equations like H(z) = E k (x), where H is a hashing and E an encryption function, cannot be solved in polynomial time. We model this by assuming that the images of different principals' composing rules are disjoint:
Definition 8 (Global Collision
The two phase theory (Theorem 9) follows immediately from Definitions 7 and 8. It states that applying a decomposing rule after a corresponding composing rule yields no new information. We can therefore derive Oscar's maximal state of knowledge in a minimal number of steps by applying all the decomposing rules before their composing counterparts.
Theorem 9 (Two-Phase Theory)
Suppose that the orderings of principals in P −{o} are globally collision free: If X → x is decomposing, v controls x, v ∈ X, X ′ = ∅, and X ′ → v is composing, then x ∈ X ′ .
Proof. Suppose that v controls p x, X ′ = ∅, and X ′ → p ′ v is composing. Since v controls p x, x ≺ p v and since X ′ → p ′ v is composing, there exists a value x ′ such that x ′ ≺ p ′ v. The orderings ≺ p and ≺ p ′ are globally collision free, therefore p ′ = p. By the definition of v controls p x, x ∈ X ′ because X ′ → p v is composing.
Composing/Decomposing Principals
The applicability of the two-phase theory is not restricted by its formulation in terms of composing/decomposing principals. This section presents a general criterion for identifying composing/decomposing principals which we use in the next section to demonstrate that both standard cryptographic primitives and protocol rules are composing/decomposing in our framework.
We represent composing and decomposing rules with locally collision free sets. This representation ensures that each decomposing rule has a corresponding composing rule (5) and that the composing rules are locally free of collisions (6)-i.e., for all p in P , all X and X ′ subsets of V , and all v ∈ V , [X → p v is composing and for all i ∈ D there exists a h ∈ C such that h ∈ W i and i ∈ W h
and for all i, t ∈ C and for all (x 1 , . . . , x m ), (y 1 , . . . , y m ) ∈ S,
The image Im(S) of S is defined as the set of values x i for some (x 1 , . . . , x i , . . . x m ) ∈ S such that i ∈ C.
An example of a locally collision free set is
where G, E, and S are injective functions free of collisions; that is,
, and E G(s) (x) = S v (y) for all s, v, x, and y in V . Let D = {3} indicate the position in the tuples in S which correspond to x and let C = {2, 4, 5} indicate the positions which correspond to G(s), E G(s) (x), and S s (x). Let W 3 = {1, 4}, W 2 = {1}, W 4 = {2, 3}, and W 5 = {1, 3}. Since G, E, and S are injective functions with disjoint images, S satisfies (6). Condition (5) is satisfied by taking h = 4 ∈ C and i = 3 ∈ D.
The following theorem shows how a local collision free set leads to a composing/decomposing principal. Its proof is in Appendix A.
Theorem 11 (Composing/Decomposing) Let p ∈ P − {o} be a principal such that
where S is local collision free with respect to C, D, and W i , i ∈ C ∪D. Let F p be the maximal 2 fixed set with
S). Then, p is composing/decomposing; composing rules correspond to i ∈ C and decomposing rules correspond to i ∈ D. The image of the composing rules is {v
Applying Theorem 11 to our example, we define the encryptor/decryptor/signer e by the decomposing rule (e, x, p, {(p, s), (p, E G(s) (x))}) and the composing rules (e, G(s), p, {(p, s)}), (e, E G(s) (x), p, {(p, G(s)), (p, x)}) and (e, S s (x), p, {(p, s), (p, x)}). The decomposing rule corresponds to the position 3 ∈ D and models decryption; the composing rules correspond to the positions 2 ∈ C, 4 ∈ C, and 5 ∈ C and model public key generation, encryption, and signing. The principal e is therefore composing/decomposing, and the two-phase theory holds for E, G, and S.
The composing/decomposing theorem is compatible with the knowledge flow theorem if the fixed set F p satisfies the single source axiom. In Appendix A, we show that this is equivalent to assuming that it is hard to solve the equation x = w(x) where w(x) = S a (E b (G(E G(Sc(x)) (d)))) is some function composed of G, E, and S.
Primitives
We now present a sample library of composing/decomposing primitives, which is sufficient for modeling a wide range of security protocols. The library includes the standard cryptographic primitives: encryption/decryption, signing, pair/set construction, nonce generation, and hashing. It also provides a special rule primitive that allows protocol rules to be modeled in the composing/decomposing pattern.
Cryptographic Primitives
Encryption/Decryption Public key encryption [31] consists of a (probabilistic) encryption algorithm, a decryption algorithm, and a (probabilistic) key-generating algorithm. Given some security parameter, the key-generating algorithm generates a public-secret key pair. We model p's private key SK(p) as belonging to p's initial knowledge, (p, SK(p)) ∈ k 0 . We model the public key as a one-way function of the secret key, i.e., PK(p) = G(SK(p)). Hence, one can compute a corresponding public key from the given secret key but not vice versa. Letting e denote the principal representing public key encryption, we can express key-generation as follows: for all p ∈ P and s ∈ V , (e, G(s), p, {(p, s)}) ∈ R. If we project this family of rules on Oscar, we obtain
Given a plaintext x and a public key G(s), the encryption algorithm computes the ciphertext 3 E G(s) (x). Thus, the parameterized rule for encryption is, for all p ∈ P and s, x ∈ V , (e, E G(s) (x), p, {(p, G(s)), (p, x)}) ∈ R. Projecting the rule on Oscar yields
Given a ciphertext E G(s) (x) and the secret key s, the decryption algorithm computes the plaintext x. Hence, for all p ∈ P and s, x ∈ V , (e, x, p, {(p, s), (p, E G(s) (x))}) ∈ R and
Signing
We can model digital signatures [31] by extending e with the rules of the form (e, S s (x), p, {(p, s), (p, x)}) ∈ R, for all p ∈ P and s, x ∈ V , which translate into
In practice, the principal who receives x and its signature S s (x) can verify the signature by using the public key G(s). In our model, it is sufficient to note that knowledge of y = S s (x) already verifies that y is a signature of x, signed by using the secret key s. That is, the principal who obtained y from e knows both s and x. Symmetric key encryption is modeled by (9) and (10) where G(s) is replaced by s and where s represents the symmetric key. We can extend this definition with (11) to include message authentication codes (MACs). Pairing/Set Construction Let t be a principal such that a communication rule (t, v, p a , k a ) is in R if and only if one of the following holds for v ∈ V , p a ∈ P , and k a ∈ K: (i) v = (x, y) and k a = {(p a , x), (p a , y)} for some x, y ∈ V , (ii) k a = {(p a , (v, y))} for some y ∈ V , or (iii) k a = {(p a , (x, v))} for some x ∈ V . Projected on Oscar, this set of rules becomes
Replacing (x, y) by {x, y} in (12-14) turns t into a primitive that generates sets of cardinality 2.
Nonce Generation
Let I(p) ∈ V represent the public identity of p (the identity function I embeds P in V ). We model nonce generation with the nonce primitive n and the parameterized rule
The dependence of n's output on I(p) ensures that p cannot learn other principals' nonces from n. The parameter v represents the seed from which a pseudo random nonce is generated. If a protocol stipulates that a principal p needs to generate a new nonce in response to a received message m, then v is taken to be equal to m. For the first nonce of a protocol, we take v to be the empty string ǫ.
Hashing
We define the primitive h for calculating hashes H(x) with the family of rules ∀ p∈P,x∈V (h, H(x), p, {(p, x)}) ∈ R and
The Rule Primitive
Protocol rules do not compute new values; rather, they model the transmission of values computed by the primitives. We can therefore embed protocol rules into the initial state of knowledge as follows.
With each (parameterized) protocol rule x → y, we associate the value |x → y| ∈ V . This value is composed/decomposed by the rule primitive r via the parameterized rules ∀ p∈P,x,y∈V (r, |x → y|, p, {(p, x), (p, y)}) ∈ R and ∀ p∈P,x,y∈V (r, y, p, {(p, |x → y|), (p, x)}) ∈ R, whose projected forms are ∀ x,y∈V [{x, y} → |x → y|] and (17)
We represent each protocol rule x → y with the initial knowledge (o, |x → y|). Oscar can now use (18) to learn y from |x → y| if he knows x. For example, the following addition to k 0 , together with (18) , simulates the rule (3) of the Needham-Schroeder protocol:
Summary
The rules (8)- (18) define a library of primitives-e, t, n, h and r-that are composing/decomposing according to Theorem 11. The following assumptions are implicit in their definitions:
The Collision Free Axioms It is hard to compute collisions of the composition rules (8), (9), (11), (12) , (15) , (16) and (17) . Therefore, we model these rules as injective functions that are mutually free of collisions; that is, they satisfy the local and global collision free axioms. The Single Source Axiom It is hard to compute fixed points of functional compositions of the rules (8), (9) , (11), (12), (15), (16) and (17) . The principals e, t, n, h and r hence satisfy the single-source axiom. Cryptographic Primitive Properties It is hard to compute the inverses that are not encoded by the decomposition rules (10), (13) , and (14) . The rules (8-14) represent Oscar's computational means in The Dolev-Yao intruder model [14] . This assumes perfect cryptography: the set of values is supposed to be a free algebra.
Collision freeness and perfect cryptography are routinely assumed when reasoning about security protocols. To the best of our knowledge, however, the necessity of assuming the single source axiom has not been recognized before. We discovered it using the Alloy Analyzer [23] , a general purpose model finder, to check a security theorem about knowledge flows in the CPUFs renewal protocol [19, 18] : in the absence of the axiom, the Analyzer generates a false counterexample to the theorem based on a fixed value that satisfies the equation x = E s (x).
Related Work
The first formalisms designed for reasoning about cryptographic protocols are belief logics such as BAN logic [8] , used by the Convince tool [25] with the HOL theorem prover [22] , and its generalizations (GNY [21] , AT [3] , and SVO logic [41] which the C3PO tool [13] employs with the Isabelle theorem prover [37] ). Belief logics are difficult to use since the logical form of a protocol does not correspond to the protocol itself in an obvious way. Almost indistinguishable formulations of the same problem lead to different results. It is also hard to know if a formulation is over constrained or if any important assumptions are missing. BAN logic and its derivatives cannot deal with security flaws resulting from interleaving of protocol steps [7] and cannot express any properties of protocols other than authentication [28] . To overcome these limitations, the knowledge flow formalism has, like other approaches [27, 33, 11, 40, 30] , a concrete operational model of protocol execution. Our model also includes a description of how the honest participants in the protocol behave and a description of how an adversary can interfere with the execution of the protocol.
Specialized model checkers such as Casper [27] , Murφ [33] , Brutus [11] , TAPS [12] , and ProVerif [1] have been successfully used to analyze security protocols. These tools are based on state space exploration which leads to an exponential complexity. Athena [40] is based on a modification of the strand space model [16] . Even though it reduces the state space explosion problem, it remains exponential. Multiset rewriting [15] in combination with tree automata is used in Timbuk [17] . The relation between multiset rewriting and strand spaces is analyzed in [9] . The relation between multiset rewriting and process algebras [32, 2] is analyzed in [5] .
Proof building tools such as NRL, based on Prolog [30] , have also been helpful for analyzing security protocols. However, they are not fully automatic and often require extensive user intervention. Model checkers lead to completely automated tools which generate counterexamples if a protocol is flawed. For theorem-proving-based approaches, counterexamples are hard to produce.
For completeness, we note that if the initial knowledge of the intruder consists of a finite number of explicit (non-parameterized, non-symbolic) values, then a polynomial time intruder detection algorithm can be shown to exist using a generalization of the proof normalization arguments [29, 4, 20] , which were employed in [6, 35] and have been implemented in the framework [36] (our two phase theorem can also be used to derive a polynomial time algorithm). However, in practice, the initial knowledge of an intruder is unbounded and represented by a finite number of parameterized sets, each having an infinite number of elements.
Concluding Remarks
We introduced knowledge flow analysis, a new framework for reasoning about knowledge in cryptographic protocols. The key advantage of the knowledge flow approach over other formalisms is its simplicity and flexibility. It is simple in the sense that the underlying mathematics is straightforward and elementary; it does not require any specialized background (in logic). It is flexible in the sense that the same library of cryptographic primitives can be used to model different protocols and that the security of a complex scheme involving multiple protocols can be verified. Knowledge flow analysis allows modeling of confidentiality and authenticity via a wide range of primitives such as pairing, union, hashing, symmetric key encryption, public key encryption, MACs and digital signatures.
Our formalism derives its simplicity from being just sufficiently expressive to enable modeling of practical cryptographic protocols. In particular, existentials [15] cannot be encoded as knowledge flows; existentials are implicitly modeled in Oscar's initial knowledge. NP-hardness proofs which use (existential) Horn clause reduction [15] or SAT3 reduction [39] are not applicable to knowledge flow analysis.
Our formalism leads to a rigorous mathematical treatment and generalization of the two-phase theory [15, 10] which is used to efficiently verify protocols. Our treatment reveals the necessary and sufficient collision free and single source axioms; it is hard to compute collisions and fixed points of compositions of cryptographic primitives. To the best of our knowledge the necessity of assuming the single source axiom has not been recognized before.
A Fixed Sets and Orderings
To prove Theorem 11, we define a sequence of subsets which we use to define a partial ordering and to characterize a fixed set.
Definition 12
Let S be locally collision free with respect to C, D, and W i , i ∈ C ∪ D. We define S n ⊆ V recursively by S −1 = ∅, and there exists a tuple (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ S}, and, for n ≥ 0,
i ∈ C and there exists a (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ S such that x j ∈ S n for j ∈ W i .
We define S ∞ = {v ∈ V : v ∈ S n for some n ≥ 0}.
We first show in Lemma 14 that V − S ∞ is a fixed set. We start with a result which we use throughout the whole proof.
Lemma 13
Let i ∈ C, (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ S, and x i ∈ S ∞ . Then (i) x i ∈ S n+1 − S n for some n ≥ 0 and (ii) x j ∈ S n for all j ∈ W i and there exists a h ∈ W i such that x h ∈ S n − S n−1 .
Proof. (i) Since i ∈ C, x i ∈ S 0 which proves n ≥ 0. (ii) Let k ≥ 0 be the smallest index for which x j ∈ S k for all j ∈ W i . Then, there exists an index h ∈ W i such that x h ∈ S k − S k−1 . Notice that x i ∈ S k+1 by the definition of S k+1 . Therefore, if k < n then x i ∈ S k+1 ⊆ S n , contradicting x i ∈ S n+1 − S n . This proves n ≤ k.
From the definition of x i ∈ S n+1 − S n we infer that there exists a t ∈ C, (y 1 , . . . , y m ) ∈ S such that x i = y t and y j ∈ S n for j ∈ W t . Since i ∈ C, t ∈ C, and x i = y t , (6) yields x h ∈ {x j : j ∈ W i } = {y j : j ∈ W t } ⊆ S n . From x h ∈ S k − S k−1 , we infer n ≥ k. We conclude n = k which proves the lemma.
Proof. Let (p, v, p a , k a ) ∈ R with v ∈ V − S ∞ . From (7) we infer that there exists an i ∈ C ∪ D and (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ S such that v = x i and k a = {(p a , x j ) : j ∈ W i }. If i ∈ C and x j ∈ S ∞ for all j ∈ W i , then, by the definition of S ∞ , x i ∈ S ∞ , which contradicts (5) shows the existence of a h ∈ C with i ∈ W h and h ∈ W i . From i ∈ W h and h ∈ C we infer that if x h ∈ S ∞ then, by Lemma 13 (ii), x i ∈ S ∞ , which contradicts x i = v ∈ V − S ∞ . Hence, x j ∈ V − S ∞ for some j ∈ W i . Let F p be the maximal fixed set such that F p ⊆ V − S 0 = Im(S). Then Lemma 14 proves that V − S ∞ ⊆ F p , hence, V − F p ⊆ S ∞ . Notice that X → p x (defined by using R F ) implies that there exists a rule (p, x, o, k σ ) ∈ R such that X = {v : (o, v) ∈ k σ } and X ∩ F p = ∅. Since F p is a fixed set, x ∈ F p contradicts X ∩ F p = ∅. Thus, for X → p x, both x ∈ F p and X ∩ F p = ∅, that is x ∈ S ∞ and X ⊆ S ∞ .
Sets S n lead to the partial ordering Notice that {v : ∃ x∈V [x ≺ p v]} ⊆ V − S 0 = Im(S). Theorem 11 follows from Lemmas 15-16, which prove that p is composing/decomposing.
Lemma 15
Let (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ S with {x j : j ∈ W i } → p x i . Then, {x j : j ∈ W i } → p x i is composing if and only if i ∈ C.
Proof. Suppose that i ∈ C. Since {x j : j ∈ W i } → p x i , x i ∈ S ∞ . By Lemma 13 (i), x i ∈ S n+1 − S n for some n ≥ 0, by Lemma 13 (ii), {x j : j ∈ W i } ≺ p x i , which proves that {x j : j ∈ W i } → p x i is composing. Suppose that {x j : j ∈ W i } → p x i is composing, that is, {x j : j ∈ W i } ≺ p x i . If i ∈ D, then by (5) there exists a h ∈ C with h ∈ W i and i ∈ W h . Since {x j : j ∈ W i } → p x i , x h ∈ S ∞ and by Lemma 13 (i), x h ∈ S n+1 − S n for some n ≥ 0. By Lemma 13 (ii), x i ∈ {x j : j ∈ W h } ⊆ S n , hence, x i ≺ p x h . This contradicts {x j : j ∈ W i } ≺ p x i and we conclude that i ∈ D, that is, i ∈ C. (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ S with {x j : j ∈ W i } → p x i . Then, {x j : j ∈ W i } → p x i is decomposing if and only if i ∈ D.
Lemma 16 Let
Proof. We prove {x j : j ∈ W i } → p x i is decomposing for i ∈ D. Then, the lemma follows from Lemma 15 since i ∈ D ⇐⇒ i ∈ C lead to composing rules. By (5), there exists a h ∈ C with h ∈ W i and i ∈ W h . By Lemma 13 (i), x h ∈ S n+1 − S n for some n ≥ 0. By Lemma 13 (ii) x i ∈ S n , hence, x i ≺ p x h .
To prove the lemma we show that x h controls p x i . Let {y j : j ∈ W t } → p y t = x h be composing, hence, t ∈ C by Lemma 15. Then (6) with h ∈ C and x h = y t states {x j : j ∈ W h } = {y j : j ∈ W t }. This proves x i ∈ {y j : j ∈ W t } and we conclude that x h controls p x i .
The composing/decomposing theorem is compatible with the knowledge flow theorem if F p satisfies the single source axiom. We need to show that it is hard to compute an element v 0 ∈ F p . First, observe that locally collision free sets often satisfy the following condition that is slightly stronger than (6): for each i ∈ C there exists an injective function c i such that c i ((x j ) j∈W i ) = x i for (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ S and such that the image of c i has an empty intersection with the images of c j , j = i; Im(S) is equal to the union of the images of c i , i ∈ C.
Since F p ⊆ Im(S), v 0 = c i (x 1 , . . . , x m ) for some i ∈ C. Since F p is a fixed set, v 1 ∈ F p for some v 1 = x j . Thus, v 0 = q 0 (v 1 ) for some function derived from c i . By continuing this argument we obtain a sequence of elements v 0 = q 0 (v 1 ), v 1 = q 1 (v 2 ), . . . In practise, the domain of the functions c i , i ∈ C, has a finite size. Thus there exist j < h with v j = v h , that is, v j is a fixed point of the equation x = w(x) where w(x) = q j (q j+1 (. . . q h−1 (x) . . .)) is some function composed of c i , i ∈ C. So, the single source axiom is satisfied if it is hard to compute compositions q 0 (q 1 (. . . q j−1 (x) . . .)) with x = w(x).
